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AARON V SEC: THE SCIENTER REQUIREMENT IN SEC
INJUNCTIVE ACTIONS
The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Aaron v. SEC' is one whose
immediate impact will be felt in all federal courts. 2 The Court in Aaron
significantly altered the enforcement scheme of the anti-fraud provisions of
the SecuritiesAct of 1933 (1933 Act)3 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (1934 Act). 4 The question in Aaron was whether the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) is required to establish scien-
ter 5 as an element of a civil enforcement action 6 to enjoin violations of sec-
1. 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980).
2. A look at scienter in the Tenth Circuit follows at notes 15-45 inh/a and accompanying
text.
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
5. The Aaron Court defined scienter as "an intent on the part of the defendant to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud." 100 S. Ct. at 1950. This is in accordance with Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), which defined scienter as "a mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Id. at 193 n.12. As in Hochfe/der, the Supreme Court in Aaron
reserved judgment whether scienter may be defined to include "reckless behavior." 100 S. Ct. at
1950 n.5.
The Tenth Circuit in the pre-Hochfelder decision of Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975), imposed a "scienter or conscious fault" requirement on
a private party seeking money damages under 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980) (rule lOb-5). 507
F.2d at 1361-62. The Tenth Circuit has also ruled that a private plaintiff need only prove that
the defendant was negligent. Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474
F.2d 514, 521 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973). In 1976, the Supreme Court in
Hochfeldr concluded that a private cause of action for money damages will not lie under either
§ -10(b) of the 1934 Act or under rule lOb-5 in the absence of an allegation of scienter. 425 U.S.
at 193.
Whether reckless conduct constitutes scienter in the Tenth Circuit has not been directly
addressed by the court of appeals. See, e.g., Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977). However, in Utah State Univ. of Agriculture & Applied Sci-
ence v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d 164, 169 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977), the
Tenth Circuit concluded that willful or intentional misconduct, or its equivalent, is an essential
element under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act. Even in the face of Bear, Steams &Co., the Tenth Circuit
nevertheless seems to have adopted a noncommittal position as to the scope of scienter. In the
recent decision of Wertheim & Co. v. Codding Embryological Sciences, 620 F.2d 764 (10th Cir.
1980), the court noted:
We recognize that recklessness has been held to be tantamount to scienter in some
circumstances . . . . However, recklessness has been defined, in such context, as a
frame of mind which comes closer to being a lesser form of intent than merely a
greater degree of ordinary negligence . . . . The trial court's determination that the
[defendants] were only negligent negates the argument that they were guilty of reck-
less conduct, if indeed there was no actual intent to deceive.
Id. at 766-67 (citations omitted).
6. The Commission is expressly empowered under § 20(b) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77t(b) (1976), to seek injunctive relief:
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or about to
engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of the
provisions of this subchapter [e.g., section 17(a)], or of any rule or regulation pre-
scribed under authority thereof, it may in its discretion, bring an action in any district
court of the United States . . . to enjoin such acts or practices, and upon a proper
showing a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted
without bond.
Similarly, § 21(d) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976), expressly authorizes the
Commission to seek injunctive relief:
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tion 17(a) of the 1933 Act,7 section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 8 and rule lOb-5, 9
promulgated under section 10(b).
The Aaron Court decided that section 10(b) of the 1934 Act 10 and sec-
tion 17(a)(1) of the 1933 Act"' are violated only when the defendant has
acted with a willful intent to defraud. On the other hand, the Aaron Court
held that sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the 1933 Act require no proof of
scienter;' 2 a finding of negligence is sufficient. The Court aisu concludcd
that because the SEC must prove some likelihood of a future violation before
an injunction can issue,13 "an important factor in this regard is the degree of
intentional wrongdoing evident in a defendant's past misconduct."'' 4 This
note will examine the state of the law before Aaron, the analysis employed by
the Aaron Court, and the implications of this decision for the federal courts.
I. THE STATE OF MIND REQUIREMENT IN SEC INJUNCTIVE
PROCEEDINGS: THE TENTH CIRCUIT
The question of whether the Commission 5 must show that the defend-
ant in an injunctive proceeding acted with scienter has been fertile ground
for commentary.' 6 When examining the history of scienter as a necessary
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or is about to
engage in acts or practices constituting a violation of any provision of this chapter
[e.g., § 10(b)], the rules or regulations thereunder [e.g., rule l0b-5(l)] . . .it may in its
discretion bring an action in the proper district court of the United States . . . to
enjoin such acts or practices, and upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary
injunction or restraining order shall be granted without bond.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). For the text of§ 17(a), see note 31 ingfa.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). For the text of§ 10(b), see note 20 infra.
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1980). For the text of rule 1Ob-5, see note 20 infa.
10. 100 S. Ct. at 1954-55.
It. Id. at 1956.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1959.
14. 100 S. Ct. at 1958. Chief Justice Burger went even further in his concurrence. The
Chief Justice noted that it will "almost always be necessary" for the Commission to establish the
defendant's intent to deceive before a court will issue an injunction. Id. at 1959.
15. This survey will limit itself to a consideration of the Commission, rather than private
parties, as plaintiff. While the outcome of a private injunctive action is identical to that of an
SEC injunctive proceeding, the elements of the action differ significantly. See generally Note,
Scienter and Injunctive Relief Under Rule lOb-5, 11 GA. L. REv. 879, 880 n.9 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as GA. L. REV.]. The Commission, because its injunctive power is a creature of statute,
must seek its injunction under either § 20(b) of the 1933 Act or § 21(d) of the 1934 Act. (For the
text of these sections, see note 6 supra). In contrast, the private plaintiff seeking an injunction
must show both irreparable harm and the inadequacy of a remedy at law. The private injunc-
tive action is judicially inferred; therefore, traditional equity principles apply. Ronbeau v.
Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 57 (1975) (private injunction sought under § 13(d) of the
1934 Act); W. DE FUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUrTY 33-37 (1950). For an argument
that the SEC and private injunctive actions should, as a matter of policy, contain the same
requirements, see Note, Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corporation and lmphed FI'wate Rights of Ac-
lion, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 93, 114 (1976).
16. E.g., Berner & Franklin, Sienter and Securitier and Exchange Commisslin Rule l0-5 Injuctiwe
Actions: A Reappraial in Light of Hochfelder, 51 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 769 (1976); Harkleroad, Require-
ments for Injunctive Actions under The Federal Securities Laws, 2 J. CORP. L. 481 (1977); Lowenfels,
Scienter or Negligence Required for SEC Injunctions under Section 10(b) and Rule 0b-5:. A Fascinating
Paradox, 33 Bus. LAW. 789 (1978); Mathews, Liabilities ofLawyers Under the Federal Securittes Laws,
30 Bus. LAW. 105 (Sp. Issue, Mar. 1975); Note, The Seienter Requirement in SEC Injunctive Enforce-
ment of Section 10(b) After Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 419 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as The Scienter Requirement]; Note, Injunctive Reief in SEC Civl Actions: The Scope ofJudiial
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element in an action for injunctive relief, it is important to note whether the
case was decided before or after Ernst &Ernst v. Hochfelder.17 In 1976, the
Supreme Court concluded in Hachfelder that a private action for money dam-
ages will not lie under either section 10(b) of the 1934 Act or rule lOb-5 in
the absence of an allegation of scienter. 18 The Hochfelder Court expressly
declined, however, to decide whether proof of scienter is required in SEC
injunctive proceedings for violations of section 10(b). 19
A. Pre-1976 Violations of Secton 10(b) of the 1934 Act
20
Prior to Hochfelder, most courts that considered whether proof of any
particular mental state was necessary in SEC injunctive actions for section
10(b) violations adopted a negligence standard.2 1 Disagreement existed
among the circuits, however, as to whether scienter or mere negligence was
the appropriate standard in private damages actions.
22
Discretion, 10 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 328 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note, Juthital Ditcre-
tion]; GA. L. REV., supra note 15; Comment, Sienter And SEC Injunctive Suits: SEC v. Bausch &
Lomb, Inc. and SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 90 HARV. L. REV. 1018 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, SEC Injunctive Suits]; The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 255
(1976); Note, SEC Enforcement Actions to Enjoin Viotlations ofSection /0(b) and Rule 1ob-5- The Scienter
Question, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 831 (1977); and Note, New Light on an Old Debate. Negligence V.
Scienter in an SEC Fraud Injunctive Suit, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 759 (1977) [hereinafter cited as New
Light on an Old Debate].
17. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
18. Id. at 193.
19. "Since this case concerns an action for damages we... need not consider the question
whether scienter is a necessary element in an action for injunctive relief under § 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5. Cf SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963)." Id. at 194 n.12.
20. This discussion is limited to SEC injunctive actions alleging violations of§ 10(b) of the
1934 Act or rule lOb-5. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act makes it "unlawful for any person. . . to
use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. . . any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1976).
Under this section, the SEC promulgated rule lOb-5, which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . .
(1) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) To make any untrue statements of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the sale or pur-
chase of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).
For an examination of SEC proceedings based on § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, see notes 148-229
infja and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 809 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v.
Dolnick, 501 F.2d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541 (2d Cir.
1973); and SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1096 (2d Cir. 1972). See also I
A. BROMBERG, SECURrrtEs LAW § 2.6(l) (1975); Berner & Franklin, supra note 16, at 781-92;
Note, Scienter and Rule 1ob-5, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1057 (1969).
The Sixth Circuit had a higher standard than that embraced by the Second, Seventh, and
Tenth Circuits. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
Co, stemmed from an SEC enforcement action based, in part, on § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and
rule l0b-5. The court in Cofy decided that the Commission must prove that the defendants
acted with a "wilful or reckless disregard for the truth." Id. at 1314.
22. Compare Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84; 93 (5th Cir. 1975) (scienter required)
with Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 735 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968) (mere
negligence required). Hochfelder settled this disagreement.
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The Tenth Circuit followed a dual approach that was initially devel-
oped in the Second Circuit. 23 In Clegg v. Conk,24 the TenthCircuit ruled that
"scienter or conscious fault" is required in a private action for money dam-
ages based on rule lOb-5.2 5 In contrast, when the SEC sought to enjoin a
fraudulent practice based, in part, on section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, the
Tenth Circuit, in SEC v. Pearson,26 concluded that "[piroof of scienter or
intent to defraud is not required to show violations justifying preliminary
injunctive relief."' 27 Similarly, the court in SECy. Ggyser Minerals Corp.2 8 held
that "[m]otive and intent, however, are not material in determining, in a[n]
[SEC] civil injunctive suit, whether the defendants have violated the anti-
fraud provisions of the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act [section 10(b)]. . . . The
state of mind of the violators is not germane."' 29 In sum, a pre-Hochfelder
private plaintiff seeking money damages would have needed to prove scien-
ter in the Tenth Circuit; however, if the Commission sought a statutory in-
junction it would not have been required to probe the state of the
defendant's mind.
B. Pre-1976 Violations of Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act
Section 17(a), unlike section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, 30 applies only to sell-
ers of securities. 3' The Seventh Circuit was confronted with a Commission
injunctive proceeding based solely upon alleged violations of section 17(a) in
SEC v. G.N. Van Horn.32 The court reasoned that given the "plain lan-
guage ' ' 3  and the peculiar legislative history of section 17(a), 34 "under
17(a) (2) and (3) proof of scienter or fraudulent intent is not essential in a suit
for injunctive relief."
'35
23. See generally New Light on an Old Debate, supra note 16, at 765-68.
24. 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975). See also note 5 supra.
25. 507 F.2d at 1361-62. See generally Krendl & Krendl, Securities, Second Annual Tenth Circuit
Survey, 53 DEN. L.J. 261 (1976).
26. 426 F.2d 1339 (10th Cir. 1970).
27. Id. at 1343. There is some confusion, however, as to whether Pearson's holding was
rooted in section 10(b) of the 1934 Act or in section 17(a) of the 1933 Act. See notes 40-43 in/fa
and accompanying text.
28. 452 F.2d 876 (10th Cir. 1971).
29. Id. at 880-81.
30. For the text of § 10(b) and rule lOb-5, see note 20 supra.
31. Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any security by the use of any
means . . .
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 7 7q (1976).
32. 371 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1966). In this case, the SEC also alleged violations of § 5 of the
1933 Act; however, § 5 is not relevant for the purposes of this survey. It is significant, however,
that the Commission did not couple its § 17(a) claim with a § 10(b) allegation.
33. The text of § 17(a) of the 1933 Act is set forth in note 31 supra.
34. 371 F.2d at 185. For an extended discussion of the legislative history of § 17(a) of the
1933 Act, see notes 173-80 in/ta and accompanying text.
35. 371 F.2d at 186.
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The Sixth Circuit stood alone in imposing a scienter standard in an
SEC enforcement action as declared in SEC v. Coffy. 3 6 In C0ffy, unlike the
charges made in Van Horn, the Commission alleged violations of section 17(a)
of the 1933 Act and section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and rule 10b-5 thereunder.
Although a violation of section 17(a) was asserted by the Commission, the
CoAq court focused on the language of section 10(b), 37 concluding that the
legislature's use of the words "manipulative" and "deceptive" ruled out any
liability for mere negligence 3 8 -regardless of the identity of the plaintiff.
39
The Tenth Circuit addressed the culpability standard of section 17(a) of
the 1933 Act in SECv. Pearson,40 a case in which the SEC sought to enjoin
alleged securities violations based upon section 17(a) 4 ' and section 10(b)
charges. Judge Holloway, speaking for the court, did not indicate whether
section 17(a) or section 10(b) formed the analytical base for his conclusion
that the SEC was not required to prove that the defendant acted with scien-
ter.42 Pearson did, however, cite the Seventh Circuit's decision in Van Horn as
support for its conclusion. 4 3 Since the SEC had not asserted a section 10(b)
violation in Van Horn, one can infer that Pearson's holding is grounded solely
on section 17(a).
As in Pearson, the Tenth Circuit case of Geyser Minerals involved securi-
ties violations based upon both section 17(a) and section 10(b).4 Citing Van
Horn, Judge Hamley in Geyser Minerals ruled that the SEC need not prove
scienter in establishing securities violations under "the anti-fraud provisions
of the 1933 Act [section 17(a)] and the 1934 Act [section 10(b)]." ' 4 5 Van Horn
does support the Tenth Circuit's finding of a section 17(a) violation. More-
over, by linking the 1934 Act to the 1933 Act, Judge Hamley suggested that
section 10(b) provides independent justification for a court's grant of an SEC
36. 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975). See the discussion of
Coy, in the context of a § 10(b) violation, in note 21 supra.
37. The text of § 10(b) is found in note 20 supra.
38. 493 F.2d at 1314.
39. The Sixth Circuit, in Co ifey, relied on the private damages action of Lanza v. Drexel &
Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973). The court reasoned that the statutory language that con-
trolled in Lanza has equal force in an SEC injunctive proceeding. 493 F.2d at 1314.
Other circuits, by way of dicta, have dealt with the degree of culpability required under
§ 17(a) in an SEC injunctive proceeding. Each of the following cases contains dicta to the effect
that § 17(a) does not impose the strict state-of-mind requirements ofa common law fraud action
for money damages: Norris & Hirshberg, Inc. v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (Every
element of common law fraud need not be proven to revoke a broker-dealer's registration.);
Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943) ("We need not stop to decide,
however, how far common-law fraud was shown. For the business of selling investment securi-
ties has been considered one peculiarly in need of regulation for the protection of the investor.");
Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1943) ("But the Commission is not bound by the
strict common law rules as to the reception and consideration of such evidence.").
40. 426 F.2d 1339 (10th Cir. 1970).
41. Id. at 1340 n.I.
42. Id. at 1343.
43. Id. Judge Holloway also cited SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S.
180 (1963). Capttal Gars involved an SEC action based on § 206(2) of the Investment Advisers
Act. Id. at 181. An examination of Capt'al Gains is found at notes 124-47 iqfa and accompany-
ing text.
44. 452 F.2d 876, 877 n.l (10th Cir. 1971).
45. Id. at 880-81 (emphasis added).
1981]
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request for a statutory injunction, even in the absence of any evidence of the
defendant's intent to deceive.
II. HOCHFELDER: PRIVATE ACTIONS UNDER SECTION 10(B)
In Ernst &Ernst v. Hochfe/der, a private plaintiff sought money damages
from an accounting firm; charging that the defendant had conducted im-
proper audits and, consequently, aided and abetted its client's violations of
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.46 The plaintiff failed to allege that the defend-
ant acted with scienter, and Justice Powell, speaking for the Court, found
this omission fatal to the action.4 7 Justice Powell rested the decision on three
pillars: 1) the wording of section 10(b); 2) the legislative history surrounding
the 1934 Act; and 3) the relationship of section 10(b) to the express civil
remedies in the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
A. The Text of Section 10(b)
Looking to the language of section 10(b) as the starting point in statu-
tory interpretation, 48 Justice Powell viewed the phrase "manipulative or de-
ceptive device or contrivance" as clearly substantiating Congress' intent to
impose liability only for "intentional misconduct." '49 The Court reasoned
that whether the words were given their "commonly accepted meaning"50 or
read as "term[s] of art,"' the outcome was the same: Section 10(b) contem-
plates "conduct quite different from negligence."
'52
The Court found the statutory language so compelling that any court
need look no further: "[M]indful that the language of a statute controls
when sufficiently clear in its context, further inquiry may be unnecessary.
'53
Nevertheless, the Court went on to examine whether a negligence standard
for section 10(b) could be inferred from the legislative history of the 1934
Act.
54
B. The Hzstogy of the 1934 Act
While conceding that the legislative history surrounding the 1934 Act
46. 425 U.S. at 190. The plaintiff did not claim that the defendant aided and abetted any
securities violations under § 17(a) of the 1933 Act. Moreover, Hochftlder expressly refrained
from deciding whether civil liability for aiding and abetting a securities fraud exists under
§ 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Id. at 192 n.7. Seegmeraly GA. L. REv., supra note 15, at 883 n.
47. 405 U.S. at 193.
48. Id. at 197. The text of § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 appear at note 20 supra.
Justice Powell chose to follow his concurring opinion in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). ("The starting point in every case involving construction of a
statute is the language itself." Id. at 756.). This represented a departure from the approach
adopted in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963). Capital Gais
noted that securities statutes should be construed "flexibly to effectuate [their] remedial pur-
poses." Id. at 186.
49. 425 U.S. at 197-98.
50. Id. at 199.
51. Id. Justice Powell noted that "manipulative" connoted "intentional or willful" decep-
tion of investors in the securities markets. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 201.
54. Id.
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was inconclusive as to the proper culpability standard, 55 the Hochfelder Court
was satisfied that there was no congressional history to support the plaintiff's
contention that section 10(b) was intended to impose liability for mere negli-
gence. 56 The Court placed great weight on the comments of Mr. Corcoran,
a spokesman for the drafters of the 1934 Act, who stated that section 10(b)
was " 'a catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices.' -57 It appears,
therefore, that it was not a case of the legislative history providing convinc-
ing support for the Court's literal reading of section 10(b), but rather it was
the failure of the plaintiff to adduce legislative history supporting a contrary
interpretation that proved decisive.
58
C. The Scheme of the Securities Laws
The Hochfelder Court ruled that the 1933 and 1934 Acts are to be viewed
as "interrelated components." '59 The Court then proceeded to point to the
particularized culpability standards of the 1933 and 1934 Acts' civil liability
provisions as evidence that mere negligent conduct would not support a sec-
tion 10(b) private action. Justice Powell noted that when Congress wanted
to create civil liability based on negligent conduct, it did so expressly.' As
an example, the Court cited section 11 (b)(3)(B) of the 1933 Act, 61 concern-
ing the liability of experts for their misrepresentations in registration state-
ments, and the associated availability of a due diligence defense. 62 The
Hochfelder decision failed to explain, however, why the express creation of the
scienter standard in section 9'of the 1934 Act would not, by the same reason-
ing, suggest a negligence culpability standard for section 10(b).
6 3
In addition, the Court in Hochfelder drew a distinction between the judi-
cially implied private damages action under section 10(b)6 and the ex-
55. The Court noted that "the extensive legislative history of the 1934 Act is bereft of any
explicit explanation of Congress's intent .... " Id. at 201.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 202.
58. Justice Powell concluded by saying: "There is no indication that Congress intended
anyone to be made liable for such practices unless he acted other than in good faith. The catch-
all provision of § 10(b) should be interpreted no more broadly." Id. at 206.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 208.
61. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976).
62. "The express recognition of a cause of action premised on negligent behavior in § 11
[of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k] stands in sharp contrast to the language of § 10(b) ......
425 U.S. at 208.
An expert's due diligence defense is a shorthand expression of the defense reflected in the
language of § 11 itself. The expert may avoid civil liability by showing that "after a reasonable
investigation" he had "reasonable ground[s] to believe" his statements were not materially mis-
leading. See, e.g., Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697-703 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
63. See generally The Scienter Requirement, supra note 16, at 422-28.
64. The existence of a private action for money damages based on § 10(b) or rule lOb-5
violations is now well settled. Eg., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730
(1975); Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971);
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
Because it was the SEC, and not a private party, who sought the injunction in Aaron, the
Supreme Court did not have "occasion to address the question whether a private cause of action
exists under § 17(a) [of the 1933 Act)." 100 S. Ct. at 1951. Cf Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733-34 n.6 (1975) (reserved for another a day a decision on an
implied right to a private action under § 17(a) of the 1933 Act). Judge Doyle, in Trussel v.
19811
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pressly created civil liability provisions based upon a negligence standard. 65
The express remedies, sections 11,66 12(2),67 and 1568 of the 1933 Act, con-
tain certain "procedural limitations;" namely, the posting of a bond for costs
(including attorney's fees), 69 an authorization for the court to assess costs,
7 0
and a relatively short statute of limitations. 71 In contrast, a judicially cre-
ated private damages action has no comparable limitations. If section 10(b)
were extended to unintcntcnina! conduct, the Supreme Court argued, plain-
tiffs would bring their securities actions under section 10(b), instead of under
sections 11, 12(2), and 15. This, of course, would nullify the procedural limi-
tations Congress intended to place on the express actions.
72
Lastly, Hochfelder addressed the ambit of rule 10b-5.1 3 Justice Powell
acknowledged that rule 10b-5 may be read to prohibit unintentional con-
duct. 74 Noting, however, the administrative history of the rule 75 and the
authority of the SEC to promulgate rules under section 10(b), 76 the Court
concluded that rule lob-5 provided no basis for extending the reach of sec-
tion 10(b) beyond intentional misconduct.
77
United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964), concluded that there are no im-
plied civil remedies under § 17(a).
65. 425 U.S. at 208-11.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976). Section 12(2) imposes liability, based on a negligence stan-
dard, on a seller of securities who makes misrepresentations in connection with the sale.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976). Under § 15, a "controlling person" is liable, under a negli-
gence standard, for the violations of § 11 and § 12 committed by a controlled person.
69. Section 1 (e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1976), empowers a court to require a plaintiff suing
under § 11, § 12(2), or § 15 of the 1933 Act to post a bond for the costs. This bond could prove
to be an insurmountable hurdle, especially when attorney's fees are included. See Dabney v.
Alleghany Corp., 164 F. Supp. 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
70. In specified circumstances, § 11 (e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1976), also authorizes a court to
assess costs at the conclusion of the litigation.
71. Section 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1976), specifies that an action brought under § I1,
§ 12(2), or § 15 can be filed no later than one year from the time the violation was, or should
have been, discovered. Regardless of the date of discovery, under no circumstances can the
period exceed three years from the time of the offer or sale.
The statute of limitations for § 10(b) actions is governed by state law. See generally Raskin
& Enyart, Which Statute Of Lmitatons In A 10b-5 Action?, 51 DEN. L.J. 301 (1974). The Tenth
Circuit's position is that the state's fraud limitation period applies to lOb-5 claims. Id. at 313.
72. 425 U.S. at 210.
73. Id. at 212-14. The text of rule lOb-5 is found in note 20 supra.
74. "Viewed in isolation the language of [rule l0b-5(2)], and arguably that of [rule lOb-
5(3)], could be read as proscribing. . . any course of conduct . . . whether the wrongdoing was
intentional or not." 425 U.S. at 212.
75. Id. at 212-13 n.32. First, Hochfelder urged that rule lOb-5 was promulgated in "response
to a situation clearly involving intentional misconduct." Id. at 212 n.32. Second, the Court
stressed the use of the word "fraud" in the Commission's announcement of the rule. Id. at 213
n.32 (quoting SEC Rel. No. 34-3230 (May 21, 1942) and 8 SEC ANN. REP. 10 (1942)).
For a critical examination of the administrative history of rule lOb-5, see Cox, Ernst &Ernst
v. Hochfelder: A Critique and an Evaluation ofIts Impact upon the Seheme ofthe Federal Securities Laws,
28 HASTINGS L.J. 569, 582 (1977). One commentator has concluded that "Hochfelder's establish-
ment of a scienter requirement must be read to stand solely upon the interpretation of the
statutory provision itself." The Sienter Requirement, supra note 16, at 424 n.39.
76. 425 U.S. at 213-14. The scope of rule lOb-5 cannot exceed the power delegated to the
SEC through § 10(b). Id. "The rule-making power granted to an administrative agency
charged with the administration of a federal statute is not the power to make law." Id. at 213.
Since the Court in Hoch/elder found "the language and history of § 10(b) dispositive," it
refused to examine policy considerations. Id. at 214 n.33.
77. Id. at 214.
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III. AARON V SEC: SCIENTER REQUIREMENT IN
SEC INJUNCTIVE ACTIONS
A. Factual Background of Aaron
E.L. Aaron & Co. (Aaron & Co.) was a registered brokerage firm.78 Pe-
ter Aaron had supervisory responsibility over Aaron & Co.'s registered repre-
sentatives, including Norman Schreiber and Donald Jacobson. In
connection with the solicitation of orders for the purchase of Lawn-A-Mat
Corporation's (LAM) securities, Schreiber and Jacobson made the following
representations: that LAM was in the process of developing a new type of
small car, that LAM's stock was about to enjoy a substantial price increase,
and that LAM was financially prospering. LAM, however, was not manu-
facturing, nor did it plan to manufacture, any cars. Furthermore, the com-
pany was losing money during the relevant period.79 Peter Aaron both
knew 8° and had reason to know 8 ' of Schreiber and Jacobson's misleading
statements. Nevertheless, Peter Aaron failed to take affirmative steps to cor-
rect or stop the misstatements.
82
The SEC filed a complaint in the District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York seeking injunctive relief. The Commission charged that
the defendant had violated and aided and abetted violations of section 17(a),
section 10(b), and rule lOb-5. The trial court agreed and enjoined Peter
Aaron from future violations of these antifraud provisions.8 3 While noting
that "negligence alone may suffice as a standard for liability in Commission
enforcement proceedings," the district court found the defendant's inten-
tional failure to terminate the misleading statements sufficient to establish
scienter.
8 4
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's
decision;8 5 however, the Second Circuit ruled that negligence alone was suf-
ficient to support injunctive actions under section 10(b) or section 17(a).
86
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, finding
that although scienter is not required in SEC injunctive proceedings based
on section 17(a)(2)-(3), scienter is a prerequisite to a judicial grant of an SEC
request for an injunction based upon either section 10(b) or section
17(a)(1).87
78. For a general discussion of the functions of a broker-dealer, see JAFFE, BROKER-DEAL-
ERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS (1977).
79. SEC v. E.L. Aaron & Co. [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,043, at 91,682-83 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 1977).
80. Peter Aaron was personally contacted by two representatives of LAM and told of the
misrepresentations. Id. at 91,683.
81. The defendant also maintained due diligence files on LAM. These files contained no
information regarding the manufacture of a car, but did indicate a deteriorating financial con-
dition. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 91,687.
84. Id. at 91,685.
85. SEC v. Aaron, 605 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1979).
86. Id. at 624.
87. Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945, 1958 (1980).
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B. Hochfelder to Aaron: The Federal Courts Grapple with Scienter
At the outset, it is important to note the distinction between the SEC's
enforcement authority as compared with the private damages action at issue
in Hochfelder. Unlike the judicially implied private remedy for violations of
section 10(b), the Commission is expressly authorized to enjoin section 10(b)
transgressioas in section 21(d) of the 1934 Act. Similarly, for violations of
section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, the SEC is expressly empowered under sectio
20(b) of the 1933 Act 88 to enjoin such acts. Both section 21(d) of the 1934
Act and 20(b) of the 1933 Act condition a court's power to issue an injunc-
tion upon "a proper showing" by the SEC that the defendant "is engaged or
about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a
violation" of the respective anti-fraud provisions. The text of these sections
is devoid of any culpability standard.
Shortly after Hochfelder was decided, the Office of the General Counsel
of the SEC issued a staff memorandum 89 that predicted that "[t]he
Hochfelder decision clearly will have an impact upon pending and future
Commission injunctive actions." 9 The first decision to assess such impact in
the context of a section 10(b) violation was the Southern District of New
York's opinion in SECv. Bausch &Lomb, Inc.91 Prior to Bausch &Lomb, the
Second Circuit had consistently granted injunctions against defendants
based merely on their unintentional misdeeds. 92 After reviewing Hochfelder's
conclusion that the language and history of section 10(b) proscribed only
intentional misconduct, the district court in Bausch &Lomb reasoned that the
same must be true for all plaintiffs pursuing remedies under section 10(b)-
regardless of the identity of the plaintiff or the nature of the remedy
sought. 93 Since Hochfelder refused to consider policy considerations support-
ing a relaxed culpability standard,94 the district court felt constrained to do
likewise. 95
The continued vitality of the Second Circuit's pre-Bausch & Lomb view
88. For the text of § 20(b) of the 1933 Act and § 2 1(d) of the 1934 Act, see note 6 supra.
89. Memorandum from The Office of the General Counsel of the Securities and Exchange
Commission to Commission Staff Attorneys Regarding Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfe/der (Apr. 26,
1976), reprinted in SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) F-I (May 26, 1976), [hereinafter cited as SEC
Staff Memo].
90. Id. at F-I (footnote omitted).
91. 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affdon othergrounds, 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977). The
Supreme Court's decision in Hochfetder was rendered during the course of the trial in Bausch &
Lomb. On appeal to the Second Circuit, the Court of Appeals specifically refrained from decid-
ing "whether scienter is a necessary predicate for injunctive relief." Id. at 14.
92. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
93. The Bausch & Lomb court stated:
Argument drawing upon the words of § 10(b) and the history, legislative and adminis-
trative, of both § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 applies equally to private suits and actions
brought by the Commission.
A careful analysis of Hohfelder has convinced this Court that the distinction is no
longer to be drawn and that the identical standard under § 10(b) and Rule l0b-5
must be applied whether the plaintiff is the SEC or a private litigant.
420 F. Supp. at 1241, 1243 n.4.
94. 425 U.S. at 214 n.33.
95. 420 F. Supp. at 1241. The district court noted that "[olnly policy considerations . . .
could support" a relaxation of the scienter requirement. Id.
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of the culpability standard in injunctive proceedings was suggested in Arthur
Lipper Corp. v. SEC.9 6 The court reviewed an SEC order revoking a broker-
dealer's registration because of violations of section 10(b). 97 Judge Friendly
likened a private damages action to an SEC administrative disciplinary pro-
ceeding: both remedies visit "serious consequences on past conduct," and
proof of scienter is, therefore, warranted in both actions. This is in contrast,
the court urged, to SEC injunctive suits whose design "is solely to prevent
threatened future harm." 98 In view of this distinction as to the nature of the
remedies, Arthur Lipper intimated that Hochfeder's scienter rule did not apply
to Commission injunctive proceedings. 99
The Second Circuit further questioned Bausch &Lomb's holding in SEC
v. Universal Major Industries Corp."°° The Commission in this case sought an
injunction against an attorney who allegedly aided and abetted his client in
selling unregistered securities in violation of section 5 of the 1933 Act.'0 1
The defendant argued that, pursuant to Hochfe/der, intent to deceive must be
proved. The court in Universal Maj'or granted the injunction, noting, by way
of dictum, that "Hochfe/der, which was a private suit for damages, does not
undermine our prior holdings" that scienter is not required in SEC injunc-
tive proceedings. 102
Notwithstanding the Second Circuit's aversion to the Bausch & Lomb
rationale, the Fifth Circuit required scienter in an SEC injunctive su:it in
SECv. Blatt.10 3 The Fifth Circuit essentially echoed the analysis of Bausch &
Lomb1°4-with one significant wrinkle. The Hochfelder Court had read the
language and history of section 10(b) to require scienter; however, Hochfe/der
involved a remedy not rooted in the language of the statute-it was con-
cerned with a judicially created private cause of action. 10 5 The Blau court
reasoned that since Congress had expressl'y empowered the SEC to seek in-
junctive relief for section 10(b) violations through section 21(d) of the 1934
96. 547 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1977).
97. Id. at 173. The statutory culpability standard in SEC administrative enforcement ac-
tions is "willfully." Section 15(b)(4) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(5) (1976). The Tenth
Circuit in Mawod v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588, 596 (10th Cir. 1979), considered the reach of Hochfelder
in the context of SEC sanctions against broker-dealers. See generaly Securities, Sixth Annual Tenth
Circuit Survey, 57 DEN. L.J. 319, 323-28 (1980).
When considering broker-dealer suspensions and revocations, courts have traditionally
viewed this remedy as more prophylactic than punitive. Accordingly, the courts have relaxed
the § 15(b)(4) willfulness requirement. See generally The Seienter Requirement, supra note 16, at 433
n.79.
98. 547 F.2d at 180 n.6.
99. Id.
100. 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976). It is noteworthy that the Commission did not allege a § 10(b)
violation, especially since the defendant's conduct appeared to be actionable under rule lOb-5.
See, e.g., SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973); see generally GA. L. REv., supra note
15, at 886 n.35.
102. 546 F.2d at 1047. The Second Circuit did not rest its holding on the "negligence-
scienter argument." Rather, Universal Major found that the defendant acted with scienter (ze.,
with knowledge or reckless disregard for the truth), obviating the good faith defense.
103. 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978).
104. Id. at 1332-34.
105. See note 64 supra.
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Act, 10 6 arguably "the scienter requirement implicit in the statute [section
10(b)] must have been intended for SEC proceedings."' 10 7 Therefore, the
Blatt court drew "a stronger inference that Congress intended to require sci-
enter in SEC actions than in private damages suits."' 0 8
C. The Subreme Court Decides That Scienter Is a Necessag Element of a Section
10(b) Violation
1. The Court Relies on the Hochfelder Rationale
Delivering the opinion of the Court in Aaron, Justice Stewart ruled that
the Hochfelder rationale "ineluctably leads to the conclusion that scienter is
an element of a violation of section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5, regardless of the iden-
tity of the plaintiff or the nature of the rehef sought."' 0 9 Justice Stewart reasoned
that Hochfelder's reading of section 10(b)'s language and legislative history
controlled, regardless of whether the plaintiff was a private party suing for
damages or the Commission seeking injunctive relief." 0 This view is consis-
tent with the district court's decision in Bausch & Lomb and with the Fifth
Circuit's opinion in Blatt. Aaron also embraced the novel reasoning ex-
pressed by the Fifth Circuit in Blatt."'I Since Hochfelder involved a judicially
implied action not within Congress' contemplation, it would be "quite
anomalous" if Hochfelder's interpretation of section 10(b) would not similarly
govern the express remedy Congress created for the SEC.'2
Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Hochfelder, had argued that the culpa-
bility standard "should not depend upon the plaintiff's identity."'"I 3 The
dissent could "see no real distinction" between private damages actions and
SEC enforcement proceedings, both predicated on section 10(b). 114 The
Aaron decision at least settles Justice Blackmun's concern for judicial incon-
sistency.
In its treatment of Aaron, the Second Circuit had looked to section 21 (d)
106. The text of § 21(d) of the 1934 Act is contained in note 6 supra.
107. 583 F.2d at 1333 n.21.
108. Id.
109. 100 S. Ct. at 1952 (emphasis added).
110. Id. Aaron noted that the third leg of Hochfelder's analysis-the structure of civil liability
provisions in the 1933 and 1934 Acts-would not be relevant in a statutory injunctive action.
Id. at 1952-53 n.9. Hochfelder did not rest its decision solely on this third factor. Rather, justice
Powell urged that the text of § 10(b), standing alone, was sufficient to support a scienter stan-
dard. 425 U.S. at 201.
111. See notes 103-08 supra and accompanying text.
112. 100 S. Ct. at 1952-53.
113. 425 U.S. at 217 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Commission also advanced the
position that the plaintiff's identity was irrelevant to imposing a scienter standard. Brief for
SEC as Amicus Curiae at 8, 16-17, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
114. 425 U.S. at 217-18. Justice Blackmun also dissented in Aaron. His assertions in
Hochfelder seem somewhat incongruous with his position in Aaron that the SEC--and not a
private party--should be granted an injunction under § 10(b) when the defendant is merely
negligent. In fairness to Justice Blackmun, however, it appears that he is consistently advocat-
ing the view that Hochfelder reached the wrong conclusion, and both private damages actions
and SEC injunctive proceedings should be successful if the plaintiff can show mere uninten-
tional conduct.
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of the 1934 Act' ' 5 to determine if scienter was required in SEC actions.
116
The Second Circuit noted that during enactment of the Securities Acts
Amendments of 1975, Congress expressed an intent to exempt the Commis-
sion from the scienter requirement.' 17 The Senate Report provided: "In
particular, issues related to matters of damages, such as scienter, causation
and the extent of damages are elements not required to be demonstrated in a
Commission injunctive action."' ' 8 The Second Circuit concluded that the
legislative intent of section 21(d) indicated that scienter was not contem-
plated for SEC injunctive suits, i9
Justice Stewart rejected, without discussion, the notion that the legisla-
tive history of section 21 (d) suggests a relaxation of the scienter requirement
in SEC actions. 120 Moreover, a closer examination of the language of sec-
tion 21(d) belies the Second Circuit's position. Section 21(d) provides that
the SEC is authorized to seek injunctive relief only when it appears that the
defendant "is engaged or is about to engage in acts or practices constitutig a
violation of [section 10(b)]" and that "upon a proper showing" a district court
shall grant the injunction.1 2 ' As Justice Stewart explained, at minimum "a
proper showing" must include proof that the defendant is presently engaged
in, or is about to engage in, a substantive violation of section 10(b). 1 2 2 Since
the Court in Hochfe/der read the language and history of section 10(b) as
requiring a showing of scienter before a court can conclude that section
10(b) has been violated, an injunction likewise is not authorized under sec-
tion 21(d) until scienter has been proven.
123
2. The Aaron Court Distinguishes a Prior Decision
The Commission urged the Court in Aaron to look to SECV. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc. 124 for precedential guidance. ' 25 Justice Stewart refused
115. Section 2 1(d) is the explicit statutory provision in the 1934 Act which empowers the
Commission to seek an injunction. The text of § 2 1(d) is found at note 6 supra.
116. SEC v. Aaron, 605 F.2d 612, 621-22 (2d Cir. 1979).
117. Id. at 622.
118. S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1975), repnrttedtn [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 179, 254 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
119. 605 F.2d at 622.
120. The Supreme Court did not address the Senate Report referred to in the court of
appeals decision. Justice Stewart simply declared that "there is nothing in the legislative history
of [ § 2 1(d)] to suggest a contrary intent." 100 S. Ct. at 1958.
121. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976) (emphasis added).
122. 100 S. Ct. at 1957-58. The Aaron Court said:
The elements of "a proper showing" thus include, at a minimum, proof that a person
is engaged in or is about to engage in a substantive violation of either one of the Acts
[ 1933 or 1934 Acts] . . . .Accordingly, when scienter is an element of the substantive
violation sought to be enjoined, it must be proven before an injunction may issue.
Id.
123. In response, the Second Circuit and the Commission would probably argue that, under
§ 2 1(d), it is not necessary to first prove a past violation of § 10(b) to obtain an injunction to
prevent conduct that will violate the act. See general/y GA. L. REV., supra note 15, at 890-91;
Comment, SEC Injnclte Suit'r, supra note 16, at 1023. As a practical matter, however, courts
generally are reluctant to enjoin future violations without a showing that the defendant has
already acted with scienter. This is apparent even in those circuits that concluded § 10(b)
would be violated if the defendant engaged in mere negligent behavior. See Lowenfels, supra
note 16, at 790; New Light on an Old Debate, supra note 16, at 784.
124. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
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this advice, concluding "that the controlling precedent here is not Capital
Gains but rather Hochfelder."'
126
In Capital Gains, the Court decided whether section 206(2) of the Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940127 (IAA) required the Commission to prove scien-
ter when it sought injunctive relief.'2 8 The Court ruled that a showing of
intent to defraud was not required.' 29 The. decision rested upen the legisla-
tive intent apparent in enacting the IAA, the elements of common law fraud,
and the appropriate scienter requirement when a fiduciary duty is pres-
ent. 
13 0
Justice Goldberg, speaking for the Capital Gans Court, focused chiefly
on the IAA's purpose: to expose or eliminate all of an investment advisor's
conflicts of interest in connection with his fiduciary position.1 3' The
Supreme Court held, accordingly, that "[it would defeat the manifest pur-
pose" of the IAA if the SEC was required to prove the advisor's state of
mind. 132 Second, Capital Gains drew a distinction between actions at law
and actions in equity.' 33 Courts traditionally have relaxed the culpability
requirement in light of the nature of the action (at law or in equity), the
character of the transaction, 34 and the special relationships of the par-
ties. 3 5 Additionally, the Court observed that the elements of a fraud action




The Aaron Court distinguished Capital Gains on three grounds: the legis-
lative history, the statutory language, and the special fiduciary relation-
ship. ' 3 7 The majority in Capital Gains had looked to the congressional intent
surrounding the IAA to support its conclusion that scienter is not required in
actions under section 206(2). In contrast, the Court in Hochfelder inferred,
from the legislative history of section 10(b), a congressional reluctance to
expand the ambit of liability to include unintentional behavior.' 38 Justice
Stewart in Aaron indicated that the phrase "any ... course of business
which operates as a fraud or deceit," in section 206(2) is concerned with the
125. Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945, 1953 (1980).
126. Id. at 1954.
127. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976). For the text of§ 206(2), see note 201 infra.
128. 375 U.S. at 181-82.
129. Id.
130. See generaly Berner & Franklin, supra note 16, at 781-85; The Scienter Requirement, supra
note 16, at 435-37; Comment, SEC Injunctwie Suits, sup-a note 16, at 1021-23.
131. 375 U.S. at 191-92.
132. Id. at 192.
133. Id. at 192-95.
134. Id. at 194. The Court noted:
There has also been a growing recognition by common-law courts that the doctrines of
fraud and deceit which developed around transactions involving land and other tangi-
ble items of wealth are ill-suited to the sale of such intangibles as advice and securities,
and that, accordingly, the doctrines must be adapted to the merchandise in issue.
Id. (footnote omitted).
135. Justice Goldberg stressed that in a fiduciary relationship, it was not necessary at com-
mon law to establish all the elements of an arm's-length transaction. Id.
136. Id.
137. 100 S. Ct. at 1954-55.
138. d. at 1954. See generally Note, The Investment Advsers Act and the Supreme Couri's Interpreta-
tzon of its Antifraud Aovisions, 37 S. CAL. L. REV. 359, 366 (1964).
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effect of the transaction-not the state of mind of the actor.' 39 Section
10(b), however, contains the terms "manipulative" and "contrivance" that
in Lochfelder were held to clearly refer to a state-of-mind requirement. The
Court noted that section 206(2) governs a special fiduciary relationship, that
of an investment advisor to his client. Section 10(b), in contrast, applies
equally to fiduciary relationships and arm's-length transactions.'4 An addi-
tional factor served to circumscribe Capital Gains's precedential value to the
Court in Aaron: Justice Goldberg had specifically found that the defendant's
conduct was purposeful; the case did not involve unintentional miscon-
duct.1 4 1 In addition, Justice Goldberg cited authority for the proposition
that at common law, fraud had a broader sweep in equity than at law.
142
Indeed, equitable relief traditionally was granted without a showing of the
defendant's state of mind. ' 4 3 The relief granted was usually rescission, refor-
mation of contract, or imposition of an equitable lien. 144 An injunction was
viewed as a more drastic remedy.' 45 The Court in Capital Cainr, however,
reasoned that an injunction was a "mild prophylactic" and thus the ele-
ments of common law fraud ought to be moderated. 146 Lower federal courts
subsequently have recognized that an injunction can be a punitive sanc-
tion. 
4 7
D. Post-Hochfelder Cases Predicated on Section 17(a) Violations
The SEC Staff Memo that followed in the wake of lochfelder correctly
anticipated an avenue of escape from the scienter burden involved in SEC
attempts to enjoin conduct violative of section 10(b). The memorandum
urged the staff to include allegations of violations of section 17(a) of the 1933
Act in their complaints. It was asserted that even if the court should read
Hochfelder "in a manner hostile to the Commission," the court still would
have "an alternative basis upon which to find a violation and to issue an
injunction." 
1 t48
Less than two months after Bausch & Lomb was decided, the First Cir-
cuit, in SECv. World Radio Misston, Inc. ,149 was faced, not surprisingly, with a
139. 100 S. Ct. at 1954. Section 206(2) of the IAA is essentially identical to rule 10b-5(c)
and Section 17(a)(3) of the 1933 Act. Aaron interpreted the similar wording of these sections in
a consistent fashion, since the high Court read section 17(a)(3) not to include a scienter require-
ment. See notes 224-29 infra and accompanying text.
140. 100 S. Ct. at 1954.
141. 375 U.S. at 192 n.39. The conduct of Peter Aaron, similarly, involved an intent to
defraud.
142. Id. at 193.
143. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 687-88 (4th ed. 1971).
144. Id. at 687.
145. See generally Chayes, The Role of th Judge in Public Law Lltigatin, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1292-96 (1976).
146. 375 U.S. at 193. Chief Justice Burger, in his Aaron concurrence, urged that "[aln in-
junction is a drastic remedy, not a mild prophylactic." 100 S. Ct. at 1959.
147. E.g., SEC v. Caterinicchia, 613 F.2d 102, 105 (5th Cir. 1980) (characterizing statutory
injunctive relief as an extraordinary measure); SEC v. Cenco Inc., 436 F. Supp. 193, 198 (N.D.
Ill. 1977) ("We agree that no injunction should be lightly issued, for the ramifications are very
serious.") See notes 281-300 infra and accompanying text.
148. SEC Staff Memo, supra note 89, at F-3.
149. 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976).
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Commission enforcement action founded both on section 17(a) and section
10(b). 150 The First Circuit, limiting Hochfelder's good faith defense to private
actions for past anti-fraud violations, 15 1 concluded that a defendant's state
of mind is irrelevant to an injunction determination.' 5 2 The function of an
injunction, the court explained, was to "protect the public against conduct,
not to punish a state of mind."' 153 World Radio Mission did not concern itself
with the sweep of Hochfelder; rather, the First Circuit rested its decision solely
on section 17(a) and ignored the section 10(b) claim.' 54 The defendant ar-
gued that since section 17(a) contains language virtually identical to rule
10b-5(2),' 155 and since Hochfelder read section 10(b) as requiring scienter, sec-
tion 17(a) should be similarly interpreted.156 The First Circuit recognized
the fallacy in this argument. 57 The Supreme Court in Hochfelder acknowl-
edged that the language of rule 10b-5, of its own force, may be read to in-
clude negligent behavior. 158 Justice Powell, however, held that such a
reading of the rule would exceed the statutory rulemaking authority of the
Commission, since the Court interpreted section 10(b) to require a showing
of scienter. 159 If anything, Hochfelder's narrow interpretation of rule lob-5
reinforces World Radio Mission's view of section 17(a).1 6 0 Although both Sec-
tion 17(a) and section 10(b) are commonly referred to as the antifraud provi-
sions of the securities laws, section 17(a) has its own language and legislative
history,' 6' which should be accorded independent vitality and not swal-
lowed by the Hochfelder view of section 10(b).
16 2
In a well-reasoned opinion, the Second Circuit, in SEC V. Coven,' 63 up-
held an SEC injunction based on section 17(a) violations in the absence of an
intent to defraud. Following the First Circuit's lead in World Radio Mission,
Judge Mansfield, for the Coven court, focused solely on section 17(a) and
explicitly refrained from deciding whether scienter was required in SEC ac-
tions under section 10(b).1 64 Judge Mansfield's examination of section 17(a)
virtually paralleled the Hochfelder treatment of section 10(b). Specifically,
150. Id. at 537.
151. Id. at 540.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 541.
154. World Radio Mission noted: "Thus, strictly speaking, since this action is founded on
both section 17(a) and Rule l0b-5, we need not decide what result would obtain in an SEC
injunction action based solely on section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 .... " Id. at 541 n.10.
155. For the language of rule lOb-5 and section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, see, respectively, notes
20 and 31 supra. Indeed, the language of rule lOb-5 was borrowed by the SEC from § 17(a).
The Commission sought to make § 17(a)'s proscriptions applicable to buyers as well as sellers. 3
L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1426-27 (2d ed. 1961).
156. 544 F.2d at 541 n.10.
157. Id.
158. See notes 73-77 supra and accompanying text.
159. 425 U.S. at 212-14.
160. Eg., SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950
(1979). See generally Comment, SEC lnjimctve Suits, supra note 16, at 1021 n.24; Note, Scinter and
SEC Injunctive Actions Undr Securtiies Act 17(a), 63 IOWA L. REV. 1248, 1255-56 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Note, Securittes Act 17(a)].
161. See notes 174-80 infra and accompanying text.
162. For an argument that scienter should be required for actions predicated on § 17(a), see
Berner & Franklin, supra note 16, at 796 n.221.
163. 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1979).
164. Id. at 1026 n.10.
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Coven reviewed the language of section 17(a), the legislative history, and the
structure of the remedies of the securities acts.
The Coven court viewed section 17(a)(2)'s language as giving no indica-
tion of a good faith defense that would imply a culpability standard requir-
ing scienter.' 65 In addition, the Second Circuit read the clause "operate as a
fraud or deceit" of subsection (3) as focusing attention on the eect of the
misrepresentation on the investing public, not on the actor's state of
mind.' 66 Some courts 167 and commentators 68 have maintained that the
use of the terms "fraud" and "deceit" in subsection (3) inherently entails an
intent requirement. The Coven court disagreed. 169 Judge Mansfield viewed
the legislative thrust of section 17(a) as expanding common law fraud to
allow actions in the absence of scienter. 170 Indeed, frustration with the inef-
fectiveness of a tort action in fraud was one of the considerations in drafting
the 1933 Act. 7 ' Moreover, Justice Powell in Hlochfelder noted that "[v]iewed
in isolation the language of [rule lOb-5(2)] and arguably that of [rule 10b-
5(3)], could be read as proscribing . . . any course of conduct . . . whether
the wrongdoing was intentional or not."'
172
After canvassing congressional history regarding the appropriate culpa-
bility standard for section 17(a), the Second Circuit concluded that its "read-
ing of the language of section 17(a) is in accord with its [section 17(a)'s]
legislative history."' 7 3 Without recounting the details of the legislative his-
165. Id. at 1026.
Most commentators agree that § 17(a)(2) has no scienter requirement. Eg., 6 L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 3552-53 (2d ed. Supp. 1969). Contra, Meisenholder, infia note 168, at
41. Section 17(a)(2) contains no reference to fraud, deceit, or manipulation. It prohibits the
procurement of property through a material misrepresentation. Of course, one can negligently
or intentionally mislead another. This statutory subsection looks to the end result and appears
indifferent to the actor's state of mind.
166. Id. at 1026 n. 1l.
167. Eg., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977); Trussell v.
United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 770 (D. Colo. 1964). Sanders argued that "even if
such a private cause of action does exist under § 17(a), it would require proof of scienter. Proof
of scienter is unquestionably required as to subsections (I) and (3) which specifically refer to
fraud. Subsection (2), on the other hand, does not expressly refer to fraud." 554 F.2d at 795.
168. Eg., 3 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD, SEC RULE lOb-5 § 8.4(330), at
204.23 (1977); 3 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1440-41 (2d ed. 1961). Seegenerall Meisen-
holder, Scienler and Reliance as Elements in Buyer's Suit Against Sellers Under Rule 10b-5, 4 CORP.
PRAC. COMMENTATOR 1963, at 27, 44-47.
169. 581 F.2d at 1026 n. 11.
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess. 1-3 (1933); 77 CONG. REc. 2983 (1933) (remarks of the sponsor of the Senate bill).
Other commentators have argued for interpreting subsection (3) to include within its pro-
scription negligent conduct, but for different reasons. One author, for example, emphasized
subsection (3)'s focus upon the effect of the defendant's conduct rather than his mental culpabil-
ity. The Scienter Requirement, supra note 16, at 431 n.72. Still another commentator engaged in a
different analysis. See generaloy Note, Securities Act 17(a), supra note 160, at 1253-54. The author
begins with the premise that "a statute should be construed in a manner that would give effect
to all its provisions." Id. at 1253. Accordingly, the additional language of subsection (3) must
make it somewhat unique from subsection (I). Given that subsection (1) proscribes only inten-
tional conduct, the commentators conclude that subsection (3)'s ambit should include actions
"done without the intent or knowledge of the defendant." Id. at 1254.
172. 425 U.S. at 212. Of course, the text of rule l0b-5(3) is virtually identical to subsection
(3) of section 17(a).
173. 581 F.2d at 1027.
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tory, 174 the essence of it is as follows: The House and Senate passed different
versions of the 1933 Act. The House bill, H.R. 5480, 7-' did not include a
willfulness requirement, but the Senate bill, S. 875,176 included the phrases
"willfully to employ" and "with intent to defraud."' 1 77 After the House re-
fused to agree to the Senate's bill, a Conference Committee was ap-
pointed.' 78 Section 17(a) of the Committee's bill was patterned after H.R.
5480,179 thus deleting the Senate's state-of-mind language. The Second Cir-
cuit in Coven reasoned that since the Conference Committee "opted for lia-
bility without willfulness, intent to defraud, or the like," the conferees could
not have intended to impose a showing of scienter under section 17(a).180
Finally, in Coven, the Second Circuit recognized a concern shared by the
Supreme Court in Ilochfelder: A reading of section 10(b) that would permit
private suits based upon unintentional conduct would undermine those sec-
tions of the 1933 Act explicitly based on a negligence standard. This is be-
cause unlike section 10(b), sections 11, 12(2) and 15 of the 1933 Act contain
procedural limitations that impinge upon a plaintiff's ability to bring suit.t"8
Even assuming the existence of a judicially implied private right of action
under section 17(a),' 8 2 the Second Circuit noted that Hochfelder's procedural
limitation concern could not properly act to limit the ambit of section 17(a)
when the SEC is the plaintiff.'8 3 In the face of section 20(b) of the 1933 Act,
which explicitly authorizes the injunctive action for violation of, thier aha,
section 17(a), Congress clearly recognized the potential liability to defend-
ants involved in Commission enforcement suits.
Shortly after Coven, the Fourth Circuit, in SEC v. American Realy
Trust, 18 4 decided that "in an action for an injunction against future viola-
tions brought by the Commission, proof of scienter is unnecessary."' 8 5 Fol-
174. For a thorough examination of the legislative history surrounding section 17(a), see
Note, Securities Act 17(a), supra note 160, at 1257-59. For the history of the 1933 Act in general,
see The Scienter Requirement, supra note 16, at 429-35, and Landis, The Legislative Hstoy Of the
Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 29, 45 (1959).
175. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. (1933). During the House hearings, H.R. 5480
was substituted for H.R. 4314.
176. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Ses. (1933), reprinted in Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-8 (1933).
177. The Senate bill, after amendment, included the following provision:
Sec. 13. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, corporation, or other entity, directly
or indirectly, in any interstate sale . . . or distribution of any securities wil4f/y to
employ any device, scheme, or artifice . . . with the intent to deftaud or to obtain money
or property by means of any false pretense . . . or to engage in any transaction...
relating to the interstate purchase or sale of any securities which operates or would
operate as a fraud upon the purchaser. . . . S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) (em-
phasis added).
178. 77 CONG. REc. 3000, 3085 (1933).
179. H.R. CON. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Ses. 12, 27 (1933).
180. 581 F.2d at 1027.
181. See notes 65-72 supra and accompanying text.
182. See note 64 supra.
183. 581 F.2d at 1027.
The Ninth Circuit, in SEC v. Blazon Corp., 609 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1979), relied almost
totally on Coven's rationale and held that "[a] showing of fraudulent intent is not required in an
action for an injunction brought by the Commission under § 17(a)." Id. at 965.
184. 586 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1978).
185. Id. at 1002.
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lowing the blueprint established by the First and Second Circuits, American
Realty confined its attention to section 17(a),18 6 examining the language of
subsection (2) of section 17(a)18 7 and its legislative history. 188 In addition,
American Realy distinguished the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Sanders v.
John Nuveen & Co., Inc. ,189 which was based upon a private action for dam-
ages. The Fourth Circuit commented that pursuant to "the whole legislative
scheme," a court should not imply a private right of action under section
17(a) without simultaneously "including a requirement of fraud or willful-
ness." 19° In dictum,' 9' the American Realy opinion clearly indicated that it
probably would not create such a private action, and, therefore, the lan-
guage of section 17(a)(2) could be accorded its commonly accepted meaning.
The American Realy court went on to conclude that those considerations were
immaterial when the Commission pursued its statutorily created injunc-
tion. 192
The circuit opinion most relevant to the Aaron decision is that of
Steadman v. SEC.' 93 The Court in Aaron194 ultimately embraced the Fifth
Circuit's reasoning in Steadman. With this decision, the Fifth Circuit came
full circle. The Fifth Circuit had previously held in Blatt that the Commis-
sion must prove scienter in an injunctive action under section 10(b).1 95 In
Steadman, the court clarified its position on scienter when the Commission, in
an administrative proceeding under section 15(b) of the 1934 Act, 96 sought
to discipline an investment advisor based on alleged violations of section
17(a) of the 1933 Act. For the most part, the court followed existing post-
Hochfelder precedent, 19 7 with special emphasis on Coven; 198 Seadmen offered
some unique contributions, however.
The petitioner in Steadman contended that Coven was distinguishable-
an injunctive action as opposed to an administrative disciplinary proceeding.
Judge Tjoflat, for the court, refused to interpret the language of 17(a) one
186. "And because of the Supreme Court's holding in [Hohfelder], that scienter must be
proven in a private action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, we will confine our attention to § 17
of the Securities Act of 1933." Id. (footnote omitted).
187. Contrary to Coven, the Fourth Circuit suggested it would have read § 17(a)(3), which
includes the language "operates or would operate as a fraud," as connoting a scienter require-
ment. Id. at 1006.
188. Ameriwan Realty found itself "in complete agreement" with Coven's reading of § 17(a)'s
legislative history. Id.
189. 554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977). Sanders interpreted subsection (2) of§ 17(a) as mandat-
ing an intent requirement: "Even if we assume that an implied cause of action does exist under
§ 17(a), for the same reasons expressed by the Court in Hohfelr we do not believe that such
cause of action can be premised upon negligent wrongdoing." Id. at 796.
190. 586 F.2d at 1006-07.
191. The Fourth Circuit was faced with an SEC enforcement action, not a private damages
action. Id. at 1007.
192. Id. at 1006-07.
193. 603 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1979).
194. For a discussion of Aaron, see text accompanying notes 207-29 thfa.
195. See notes 103-08 supra and accompanying text.
196. A review of SEC administrative disciplinary proceedings is contained in note 97 supra.
197. Pursuant to World Radio Mission, the Fifth Circuit was careful to concentrate on
§ 17(a), and not § 10(b). Furthermore, Steadman discussed, as did Comn and American Reaby, the
language and legislative history of § 17(a).
198. Steadman specifically adopted Coven's interpretation of the legislative history of
§ 17(a)(3). 603 F.2d at 1132-33.
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way when the remedy was an injunction and yet another way when a
stronger sanction was sought. 199 In sum, the court ruled that the reach of
section 17(a) turned not on the character of the relief sought but rather it
turned on the language of the statute.
20 0
Steadman, like Coven, construed subsection (3) of section 17(a) as impos-
ing li albility fnr rpre nglignrP Tn innnnrt thiq reading of suhsection (3),
Judge Tjoflat cited the Supreme Court's construction of identical language
in section 206(2) of the IAA20 1 in Capital Gains.20 2 In Capital Gains, the
Supreme Court rejected the position that the terms "fraud" and "deceit"
required proof of scienter. 20 3 The Supreme Court reasoned that "Congress
intended the [IAA] to be construed like other securities legislation . . . not
technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial pur-
poses. "204
Perhaps the most significant discussion in Steadman was its interpreta-
tion of the clause "to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud"
contained in section 17(a)(1). 205 The court concluded that the phrases "de-
vice to defraud", "scheme to defraud", and "artifice to defraud", when
viewed separately, gave rise to a strong implication that this subsection re-
quired intentional misconduct.
20 6
E. The Supreme Court Decided Against A Uniform Section 17(a) Culpability
Requirement
The Aaron Court prefaced its analysis of the language and legislative
history of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act with a discussion of some guidelines
for courts construing federal securities statutes. 20 7 Justice Stewart faced two
lines of precedent. Capital Gains stressed that securities legislation should be
interpreted "not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its
remedial purposes." 20 8 SEC v. Sloan,2° 9 however, emphasized that waving
the "remedial purposes" banner will not justify reading securities laws "more
broadly than [their] language and the statutory scheme reasonably per-
199. 603 F.2d at 1133.
200. A similar line of reasoning was followed in Blau regarding a good faith defense to a
§ 10(b) violation. The court held that § 10(b) afforded the defendant a good faith defense
whether the relief sought was money damages or an injunction. See notes 103-08 supra and
accompanying text.
201. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(2) (1976). This section provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser by use of the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly-
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as
a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client.
202. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
203. Id. at 195.
204. Id. See also Note, Securilies Act 17(a), supra note 160, at 1257.
205. 603 F.2d at 1133.
206. Steadman also noted that Hochfelder found the terms "device" and "employ" of § 10(b)
as suggestive of intentional misconduct. d.
207. 100 S. Ct. at 1955.
208. 375 U.S. at 195.
209. 436 U.S. 103 (1978).
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mit. ' ' 2 10 Aaron concluded that if the statutory text of the securities laws "is
sufficiently clear in its context and not at odds with the legislative history," a
court should look no further.2 "1 Specifically, Justice Stewart admonished
courts not to examine policy considerations when reading such statutes.
2 12
1. Subsection (1) of Section 17(a)
The Court in Aaron essentially adopted the position of Steadman. The
Supreme Court found that the language of subsection (1) of section 17(a)
"strongly suggests" some scienter requirement. 2 13 Justice Stewart read the
terms "device", "scheme", and "artifice" as connoting intentional miscon-
duct.
Justice Stewart reviewed the legislative history surrounding section
17(a). As discussed in Coven, the Senate version of section 17(a) read "will-
fully to employ any device, scheme, or artifice. ' 2 14 The House bill, however,
omitted the term "willfully." '2 15 Since the Conference Committee patterned
its bill after the House bill, 21 6 the SEC urged that, by deleting this state-of-
mind requirement, Congress intended to reject a scienter standard. 21 7 The
Court's decision, however, drew the inference (since the Conference Report
was silent as to the scienter question) that Congress believed that adding the
term "willfully" would be "simply redundant. '2 18 Therefore, the Court in
Aaron could find no "conflict between the reasonably plain meaning and
legislative history."
2 19
Justice Blackmun, in his dissent in Aaron,220 disputed the Court's read-
ing of section 17(a)(1). Looking to Capital Gains as the proper approach to
reading securities statutes, Justice Blackmun viewed the phrase "device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud" of subsection (1) as covering "a range of be-
210. Id. at 116.
211. 100 S. Ct. at 1955. A court still is vested with considerable discretion. For example,
when are the securities provisions "sufficiently clear" or "not at odds with" Congress' intent?
212. The Court cited Hochfelder. A court can still consider policy factors if the language is
not sufficiently clear or at odds with the statute's history. Moreover, this bar from examining
policy applies only when a court is construing a specific provision. The admonition does not
apply to a court considering whether to issue an injunction. See notes 255-59 ina and accompa-
nying text.
213. 100 S. Ct. at 1955.
214. S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
215. H.R. 5480, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933). The House also rejected a proposal to modify
the clause "to employ any device, scheme, or artifice," and to add "with intent to defraud."
Federal Securities Act." Hearings on HR. 4314 Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 146 (1933).
216. H.R. CON. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 12, 27 (1933).
217. 100 S. Ct. at 1957.
218. Id. Justice Blackmun disputed this inference. The Justice contended that the Confer-
ence Report noted that several "clarifying changes" of the Senate bill were intended "to remove
uncertainties" regarding SEC powers. H.R. CON. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Ses. 24 (1933).
Justice Blackmun concluded that "retention of the Senate's explicit state-of-mind language un-
doubtedly would have added clarity to Congressional intent." 100 S. Ct. at 1961 n.l.
219. 100 S. Ct. at 1957. Justice Stewart did acknowledge, however, that the history of
§ 17(a) was "ambiguous." Id.
220. Justice Blackmun, with whom Brennan and Marshall joined, concurred in part and
dissented in part. Chief Justice Burger wrote a separate concurrence.
19811
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havior including but not limited to intentional misconduct."' 22 1 The dissent
then proceeded to interpret "device to defraud" as reaching negligent acts as
well. 2 22 Justice Blackmun, who also dissented in Hochfelder, apparently did
not feel compelled to follow Hochfelder's reading of "device": "[a term] that
make[s] unmistakable a congressional intent to proscribe a type of conduct
quite diffprent from necigepne.
' "223
2. Subsections (2) and (3) of Section 17(a)
Aaron's view of subsections (2) and (3) paralleled the decisions of Coven,
American Realy, and Steadman. Justice Stewart easily concluded that section
17(a)(2) "is devoid of any suggestion whatsoever of a scienter require-
ment." 224 Aaron cited Hochfelder's interpretation of the similar language of
rule 10b-5(2) as supporting its reading of section 17(a)(2).
22 5
Similarly, Justice Stewart held that subsection (3) did not require the
SEC to establish scienter. 226 After noting that section 17(a)(3) focuses on the
effect of one's conduct-not on the actor's state of mind-the Supreme
Court looked for further support to the argument advanced in Seadman.
227
That is, since the Supreme Court in Capital Gazins concluded that section
206(2) of the IAA,228 which contains essentially the same language as section
17(a)(3), did not require a showing of intentional misdeeds, no different re-
sult could occur under section 17(a)(3). Finally, Justice Stewart examined
the legislative history of both section 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3), and concluded
that the history was "entirely consistent with the plain meaning of section
17 (a)."2 29
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF AARON
A. Only Seller's Neglgent Mtsrepresentations Are Actionable
Since the language of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act applies only to those
who sell securities, 2 30 rule lOb-5 was promulgated to cover both purchasers
and sellers. 23 1 In the wake of Aaron, however, courts will only be allowed to
221. 100 S. Ct. at 1961. Justice Blackmun noted that the terms are couched in the disjunc-
tive and thus "each should be given its separate meaning." Id.
222. Id. Justice Blackmun relied principally on three grounds to support his reading of the
term "device": (1) the legislative history used "device" as a synonym for "practice," a word that
does not communicate a scienter requirement; (2) Congress has interpreted "device" in the con-
text of § 15(c)(1) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1) (1976), as including unintentional be-
havior; and (3) other statutes have given "device" a broad sweep. Id.
223. 425 U.S. at 199.
224. Id. at 1955. In fact, it appears generally agreed that "[tihere is nothing on the face of
Clause (2) itself which smacks of scznter or intent to defraud." III L. Loss, SECURITIES REGU-
LATION 1442 (2d ed. 1961). But see Berner & Franklin, supra note 16, at 796-97 n.221.
225. See notes 155-60 supra and accompanying text.
226. 100 S. Ct. at 1955-56.
227. See notes 201-04 supra and accompanying text.
228. 375 U.S. at 200.
229. 100 S. Ct. at 1957.
230. Section 17(a) uses the phrase "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of
any securities .... "
231. Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373, 381 (1943). Rule lOb-5 applies "in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security."
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enjoin a seller's unintentional misconduct. Justice Blackmun, in his Aaron
dissent, denounced "this halfway-house approach" that "drives a wedge be-
tween" buyers and sellers.2 32 Justice Blackmun stressed that this is the result
of "the Court's technical linguistic analysis. '233 In the Court's defense,
Chief Justice Burger, in his concurrence, stated that Aaron was compelled by
Hochfelder and by the language of the anti-fraud provisions. 234 The Chief
Justice noted that "if. . . the result [of the Aaron decision] is 'bad' public
policy, that is the concern of Congress where changes can be made.
'2 35
As Justice Stewart noted, as recently as 1979 the Supreme Court had
examined the differences among the three subparagraphs of section 17(a).
2 36
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in UnitedStales v. Naq/altn,23 7 reasoned
that "by the use of the infinitive 'to' to introduce each of the three subsec-
tions [of section 17(a)], and the use of the conjunction 'or' at the end of the
first two, each subsection proscribes a distinct category of misconduct. '238
One commentator has urged that the reach of section 17(a) need not be
limited to sellers.2 39 The same author emphasized that "the broader policies
of the 1933 and 1934 Acts [to place buyers and sellers on equal footing] sup-
port treating them identically.''
4
B. When Will an Injunction be Granted?
The occurrence of past securities transgressions does not automatically
give rise to injunctive relief.24' Rather, the touchstone in a district court's
calculus is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that a future violation
will be committed. 242 Unlike a damages action, the purpose of an injunc-
tion is to prohibit continuing and future violations of the anti-fraud provi-
sions.243 An appeal to the equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts
244
permits a federal district court to weigh various factors, 245 such as the nature
of the prior securities violations,2 46 a past pattern of violations,2 47 and the
defendant's demeanor and cooperation,2 48 when considering an injunctive
232. 100 S. Ct. at 1965.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1958-59.
235. Id. at 1959.
236. Id. at 1956.
237. 441 U.S. 768 (1979).
238. Id. at 774 (footnote omitted).
239. See generaly The Seenter Requiremeni, supra note 16, at 433-34.
240. Id. at 434 n.84 (footnote omitted).
241. See SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785, 787 (9th Cir. 1979).
242. E.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v.
Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241, 249 (2d Cir. 1959). Jaeger & Yadley, Equitabl Uncertani.s in SEC
lnjunctwe Actions, 24 EMORY L.J. 639, 640 n.5 (1975).
243. SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 807 (2d Cir. 1975).
244. "An appeal to the equity jurisdiction conferred on federal district courts is an appeal to
the sound discretion which guides the determinations of Courts of equity." Meredith v. City of
Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 235 (1943).
245. See generally Harkleroad, supra note 16, at 491-96; Note,Judtwial irreton, supra note 16,
at 343-53.
246. See SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1314 (6th Cir. 1974), cer. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
247. See SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1974).




The single most important measure used in the balancing scheme is the
defendant's mental culpability.249 While a showing of good faith may not
conclusively bar injunctive relief,250 proof of misrepresentations made in bad
faith may present a formidable hurdle for the defendant. 25' Indeed, Chief
Justice Burger observed in Aaron that "it will almost always be necessary for
the Commission to demonstrate that the defendant's past sins have been the
result of more than negligence." 252 Although the Chief Justice did not cite
any authority, lower courts2 5 3 and commentators254 support his observation.
C. The Role of Poh Considerations
Both Hochfelder2 55 and Aaron256 found the statutory language and the
legislative history of the securities acts sufficiently clear to preclude analysis
of the policy arguments advanced. This is not to say, however, that policy
considerations will not play a role under the securities statutes. Justice
Rehnquist was eager to weigh policy considerations 25 7 when he determined
the scope of standing under rule lOb-5 in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores.2 58 In addition, a district court, in the exercise of its equitable discre-
tion, will still balance the public and private interests involved before issuing
an injunction. Specifically, even after a trial court follows Aaron's holding on
the scienter requirement and ultimately finds securities violations-at all
times closing its eye to policy-the same court still must weigh the compet-
249. See Note, Judcatl Dscretion, supra note 16, at 343-46; Comment, SEC lnjuncie. Suits,
supra note 16, at 1025-26. The Court in Aaron noted that "lain important factor ... is the
degree of intentional wrongdoing evident in a defendant's past conduct." 100 S. Ct. at 1958.
250. See Harkleroad, supra note 16, at 494. It must be remembered that this discussion of
good faith is beyond the question of what constitutes a violation of § 17(a) or § 10(b).
251. See, e.g., SEC v. Broadwall Sec., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
252. 100 S. Ct. at 1959.
253. See, e.g., SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1334-35 (5th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Wills, [1979
Decisions] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,712 at 94,771-72 (D.D.C. Dec. 14, 1978).
254. Two commentators have examined post-Hohflder decisions and both conclude that
not one court has issued an injunction without a showing of scienter: Lowenfels, supra note 16,
at 790; New Light on an Old Debate, supra note 16, at 767 n.50.
As one commentator notes:
[A] survey of the cases would indicate that for the most part injunctive relief has not
been granted without an indication by the Court that the past conduct was willful.
Therefore, no matter what the articulated standard, Courts seem generally to search
for willful conduct upon which to base an injunction.
Brodsky, WilZ4lness in SEC Enforcement Proceedings, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 15, 1976, at 1, col. I, at 2, col. 3
(footnote omitted).
Finally, in Katz & Nerheim, .Injunctive Proceedings and Ancillayy Remedies Under Federal Securities
Statutes, in THE 10B SERIES OF RULES 183 (K. Bialkin ed. 1975) the authors quote Professor
Loss: "[Y]ou bring out all the dirt you possibly can, about bad faith and the like, but that is not
essential to the Court; it just helps you get the injunction." Id. at 195-96.
255. 425 U.S. 185, 214 n.33.
256. 100 S. Ct. at 1957 n.19.
257. Justice Rehnquist attacked the "vexatious" litigation in Blue Chip Stamps and expressed
the need to delimit private lOb-5 suits, describing the action as a "judicial oak which has grown
from little more than a legislative acorn." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores 421 U.S.
723, 737 (1975). See generally Note, Judicial Retrenchment Under Rule /0b-5: An End to The Rule as
Law? 1976 DUKE L.J. 789, 798.
258. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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ing policy goals in fashioning the appropriate remedy. 259 Accordingly, the
competing interests, both public and private, will be examined here.
The underlying purpose of the 1933 Act is to protect investors by re-
quiring full and accurate disclosure of all material information in connection
with a public offering of securities. 26° The purpose of the 1934 Act is to
protect investors from stock manipulations and to impose reporting require-
ments on certain companies. 26 1 Viewed in conjunction, these securities stat-
utes are designed to foster market integrity and guard against the financial
bilking of investors.
262
The Commission is viewed as the "statutory guardian" of the investing
public. 263 To the extent that the SEC must prove the defendant's intent to
defraud, the evidentiary burden may obstruct Commission enforcement ef-
forts.2 6 4 The SEC was created with the intention that it possess flexible rem-
edies deemed necessary for effective enforcement of the securities laws.2 6 5
Moreover, the relief that the SEC seeks, a statutory injunction, has an objec-
tive quite different from a private damages action. An injunction is aimed
not at punishing past wrongdoing 266 but at protecting the public against
recurring and future securities violations. 26 7 The injunction is "prophylac-
tic" in nature.
268
An injunction, it is argued, also has a general deterrent function. The
Supreme Court, in an unrelated context, stated that "[tihe historic injunc-
tive process was designed to deter, not to punish. '269 Nevertheless, the de-
terrence value of an injunction based on negligent violations of the anti-
fraud provisions seems questionable. Indeed, it may be that negligent mis-
representations defy control by the injunctive method. 270 It seems implausi-
ble that an injunction could successfully enjoin negligent misstatements that,
by definition, are inadvertent and unintentional.
2 7'
Perhaps the most oft-repeated policy in support of the issuance of an
injunction based on negligent conduct is that "it would be preferable to
place liability for negligent misstatements on the shoulders of those responsi-
ble for their dissemination rather than to require innocent investors to suffer
259. See SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 541 (Ist Cir. 1976). See generall ,
GA. L. REV., supra note 15, at 896-98. Once a past violation has been proved, "no per se rule
requires that an injunction issue." SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1979).
260. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
261. Id.
262. See, e.g., SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 540-41 (Ist Cir. 1976); SEC
v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1095-97 (2d Cir. 1972).
263. See SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 808-09 (2d Cir. 1975); See also
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Ses. 5 (1934).
264. See SEC v. Shiell, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,190, at
92,386 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 1977).
265. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934); H.R. REP. NO. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 7 (1934).
266. The purpose of damages is to punish the wrongdoer and to make the defrauded inves-
tor whole. See general)y W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 2, 9 (4th ed. 1971).
267. Eg., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972).
268. SEC v. J. & B. Indus., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 1082, 1084 (D. Mass. 1974).
269. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944).
270. See generally New Light on an Old Debate, supra note 16, at 781-82.
271. See SEC v. Universal Major Indus., 546 F.2d 1044, 1047 (2d Cir. 1976).
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in silence." 272 As a corollary to this philosophy, it is urged that the effect of
a misrepresentation is the same regardless of whether the misinformation
resulted from a negligent mistake or a fraudulent design.
273
What this argument fails to recognize, however, is the countervailing
considerations of policy. First, the Supreme Court in Hochfelder noted that
"[tqhe logic of this effect-oriented approach would impose liability for wholly
faultless conduct where such conduct results in harm to investors."'2 74 In-
deed, since an investor's loss is identical whether the defendant's misrepre-
sentation was purey znnocenl or negligent, should a court also impose an
injunction for inocent misstatements to better protect investors? However
one answers this question, it illustrates a second countervailing policy inter-
est: There are social costs associated with strengthening the protections
granted the investing public. 275 In short, there are tradeoffs.
Undoubtedly, the more the culpability standard is relaxed, the more
protection investors receive. But exactly how much additional protection?
Investors, as a group, can be divided roughly into four classes: those subject
to purely faultless misrepresentations, those subject to intentional misrepre-
sentations, those subject to negligent misrepresentations, and those not sub-
ject to any misrepresentations. Of course, the incremental benefits of an
injunction based on negligent securities violations accrue exclusively to that
class of investors victimized by neg/igent misrepresentation. 276 The benefits
flowing to that particular class of investors should be balanced against the
aggregate costs of enjoining negligent misconduct. The Roosevelt Adminis-
tration intended the 1933 Act to achieve its goals with the least possible
disruption of genuine business interests. 2 77 Courts may properly consider
the burden imposed upon a defendant when an injunction issues on the basis
of negligent conduct. 2 78 The social cost all investors must bear, at least indi-
rectly, 2 79 stemming from an unintentional culpability standard is the addi-
tiohal 'expense to securities dealers for insurance to cover their expanded
liability exposure.
280
A more important countervailing policy is that a sanction should be
272. Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945, 1965 n.5 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
273. Id. See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); 3 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD, SEC RULE lOb-5
§ 8.4(508) at 204.11 to -. 112 (1977).
274. 425 U.S. at 198.
275. See generally Note, Securities Regulation, 5 J. CORP. L. 377, 391-94 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Securties Regulation].
276. Those investors bilked by innocent, ie., non-negligent, misstatements probably would
have no recourse under § 17(a) or § 10(b). Those investors harmed by intentional misrepresen-
tations would receive no additional protection because they would be covered under either a
negligence or a scienter culpability standard. Finally, that class of investors not encountering
any securities swindle needs no protection.
277. Message From the President-Regulation of Securities Issues, 77 CONG. REC. 937
(1933). See generally Note, Securities Act /7(a), supra note 160, at 1262-63 n. 150.
278. See A. BROMBERG, SEcURITIES LAW: FRAUD, SEC RULE lOb-5 § 8.4(508), at 204.113-
.114 (1977).
279. An implicit assumption is that, in the long run, securities dealers will be able to shift to
their clients, in full or part, any increased operating expenses incurred throughout the industry.
280. See Note, Securities Regulation, supra note 275, at 392.
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commensurate with the defendant's culpability. 28 ' Accordingly, at common
law the ambit of an actor's tort liability was contingent upon whether the
defendant made intentional or negligent misrepresentations.2 82 In light of
this policy, a court's inquiry should focus, not solely on the investor's injury,
but on whether the sanction bears some reasonable relationship to the actor's
mental culpability. 28 3 The upshot is that a trial court should carefully ex-
amine the consequences of an injunction vis-A-vis the defendant's uninten-
tional misstatement.
Some courts, especially in the early decisions, 28 4 glossed over the serious
burdens imposed by injunctions. 2 5 Recently, however, courts 286 and com-
mentators287 have re-examined the impact of SEC injunctions. Unquestion-
ably, under some circumstances, injunctive relief cannot be accurately
characterized as a "mild" sanction.
The immediate result of an injunction is that the defendant is under a
court order to comply with the anti-fraud provisions. Failure to comply may
result in civil or criminal contempt proceedings. 2 8 The sanctions against
the individual include: disqualification of an attorney or accountant from
professional practice before the SEC under a rule 2(e) proceeding; 28 9 suspen-
sion or revocation of a broker-dealer's registration; 290 and disqualifications
under the 1933 Act and the IAA.2 9 1 The rule 2(e) proceeding can be partic-
ularly distressing. The Commission may, under paragraph (3) of rule 2(e),
"temporarily suspend" any attorney or accountant who has been "perma-
nently enjoined" from violating federal securities laws.2 92 This suspension is
it/houl notice or hearing.2 93 Furthermore, although the suspension is la-
beled "temporary," to lift it, the professional must: 1) file a petition within
281. See, e.g., Ultramares v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). See
generally GA. L. REV., supra note 15, at 894-99.
282. GA. L. REV., supra note 15, at 895.
283. See 5 A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE l0b-5 § 63, at 3-161 to -162 (rev. ed. 1976).
284. Capital Gains characterized an injunction as a "mild prophylactic." 375 U.S. 180, 193
(1963).
285. E.g., Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC, 547 F.2d 171, 180 n.6 (2d Cir. 1976).
286. See, e.g., SEC v. Caterinicchia, 613 F.2d 102, 105 (5th Cir. 1980) (district court had
characterized an injunction as an "extraordinary measure"); SEC v. Petrofunds, Inc., 414 F.
Supp. 1191, 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (noted "harmful impact of a receiver and an injunction on
the legitimate activities of the defendant").
One district court noted:
Despite SEC arguments to the contrary, what it seeks is more than a mere prophylac-
tic related to the specific facts of the case. The broad, all-encompassing injunction
sought here against any conceivable future violations carries the strong inference that
the court believes the defendants would violate the law but for the court's interces-
sion ....
SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1245 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), a 'don other grounds, 565
F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977).
287. See Mathews, Liabiltdies of Lawyers Under the Federal Securities Laws, 30 Bus. LAW. 105
(Sp. Issue, Mar. 1975); Note,Judacial Discretion, supra note 16, 340-43; New Light on an Old Debate,
supra note 16, at 780-81.
288. E.g., Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969).
289. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(3)(i) (1979). See generally Marsh, Rule 2(e) Proceedings, 35 Bus.
LAW. 987, 993-94 (1980).
290. Sections 15(b)(5) and (7) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(5), (7) (1976).
291. See generally Berner & Franklin, supra note 16, at 785-86.
292. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2e(3) (1979).
293. Marsh, supra note 289, at 999-1001.
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thirty days after being served with the order; and 2) bear the burden of
convincing the Commission that he or she should not be censured.294 Even
worse, the consequences of being suspended from practicing before the SEC
are not de minimis. Apparently, the Commission considers any services ren-
dered in connection with the federal securities laws to be included within the
suspended activities.29 5 In effect, a rule 2(e) suspension could be the end of a
security attorney's livelihood.
The comparable penalties against the corporation include the loss of
business, the injury to reputation, 296 and the possible disclosure of the in-
junction in mandatory Commission and shareholder reports. 29 7 In addition,
the Commission has certain ancillary remedies at its disposal, such as dis-
gorgement of profits, rescission, and appointment of a receiver.29 8 Aside
from the above punitive aspects of an SEC enforcement action, the legal fees
of defending against the injunction are usually very high. 299 In the face of
all this, some commentators have argued that especially if the defendant is a
securities lawyer, the imposition of an injunction is a more stinging sanction




The Aaron decision seems compelled by the Court's holding in Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder and the statutory language of the anti-fraud provisions of
the securities laws. Indeed, the Hochfider Court's reading of the language of
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act must have universal application-regardless of
the identity of the plaintiff or the nature of the relief sought. Viewing the
text of sections 17(a)(2) and (3) of the 1933 Act, the Aaron Court could not
find language indicating that scienter is necessary to constitute a violation of
these provisions. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court recognized that a past
securities violation does not automatically give rise to injunctive relief.
Rather, a district court, in exercising its equitable discretion, must focus on
the likelihood of future violations. A key, if not decisive, factor in the district
294. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(3) (1979). Seegeneralo Marsh, supra note 289, at 1012-13.
Professor Marsh succinctly notes:
The Commission has constantly argued before the Courts that no one should object to
being subjected to the "mild prophylactic" of being enjoined against violating the law;
and that, if he has no present intention of doing so in the future, he should not resist
being required to conform to the law by order of the Court. However, in the next
breath the Commission, under this Rule, has asserted the right to deprive a profes-
sional subject to such an injunction of his right to practice solely as a result of the
injunction having been entered, unless he can carry the "burden of proof" of convinc-
ing them that he is not deserving of this punishment.
Id. at 1013.
295. Marsh, supra note 289, at 993-95.
296. Bauman, The Future ofRule lOb-5: A Comment onJacobs, The Impact afRule lob-5, 4 SEc.
REG. L.J. 332, 345 (1976).
297. See Note, Judicial Discretion, supra note 16, at 342.
298. See generally Jacobs, Judicial and Administrative Remedies Available to the SEC For Breaches of
Rule lOb-5, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 397 (1979).
299. See Griggin, The B&leagured Accountants. A Defendant's Viwpoint, 62 A.B.A.J. 759, 761
(1976).
300. See Berner & Franklin, supra note 16, at 785-86; Mathews, supra note 287, at 107.
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court's balancing of the public and private interests involved will be the de-
fendant's mental culpability. Therefore, the battleground in securities litiga-
tion seems to have shifted away from whether scienter constitutes a securities
violation to whether a finding of scienter is crucial before a trial court may
grant an injunction.
Steve M. Skoumal

